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Abstract Insiders are often legal users who are authorized
to access system and data. If they misuse their privileges, it
would bring great threat to system security. In practice, we
could not have any knowledge about fraud pattern in advance,
and most malicious behaviors are often in accordance with
security rules; thus, it is difficult to predefine regulations for
preventing all kinds of frauds. In this paper, we propose a
data-driven evaluation model to detect malicious insiders,
which audits user behaviors from both parallel and incre-
mental aspects. Users are grouped together according to their
positions and responsibilities, based onwhich the normal pat-
tern is learned. For each user, a routine behavior pattern is
also learned for historical assessment. Then, users are eval-
uated against both group patterns and routine patterns by
probabilistic methods. The deviation degree is adopted as an
evidence to justify an anomaly. We also recognize the abnor-
mal activities that often make a user behavior much deviate,
which can help an administrator revisit security policies or
update activity weights in assessment. At last, experiments
are performed on several real dataset.
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1 Introduction
A malicious insider refers to an employee, a contractor or a
business partner who has or had been authorized access to an
organization information system and intentionally exceeds or
misuses his/her privilege in a manner that negatively affects
the confidentiality, integrity or availability of an information
system [1]. It may involve fraud, theft of commercial secrets
or intellectual property, sabotage of information and system,
etc. [2,3]. Insider threats often result in economic loss and
organizational reputation damage. According to Computer
Crime andSecurity survey sponsored byCSI and FBI, 87.1%
of respondentswhich includemajor organizations in theUSA
said that 20%of their losses should be attributed tomalicious
insiders [4]. Such loss is often in hundreds of millions mag-
nitude and is increasing year by year. Hence, insider threat
is inherently a major problem to address.
However, malicious insiders are often legal users and are
authorized to access information system or data. It is a chal-
lenge to detect whether their motivations and behaviors are
benign or malicious. In order to solve this problem, a lot of
efforts have been made to detect and prevent insider threats.
From a managerial perspective, regulations are enforced on
both an individual action and group activities according
to security requirements and business responsibilities. For
example, a database user is allowed only to access the per-
mitted cells of database or to perform some statistic queries
rather than to query a concrete cell [5,6]. Another example
on group regulation is the separation of duty (SoD) policy,
which distributes the authorizations of performing sensitive
tasks to multiple persons so as to reduce the fraud risk [7,8].
From the technical perspective, the main purpose is to
ensure the effective enforcement of security regulations.
Audit is an important technique of examining whether user
behaviors in a system are in conformance with security poli-
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cies [9,10]. Many methods audit a database processing by
comparing a user SQL query expression against some pre-
defined patterns so as to find out an anomaly [11,12]. But
a malicious query may be made up as good looking so as
to evade such syntactic detection. To overcome this short-
coming, the data-centric method further audits whether the
data a user query actually accessed has involved any banned
information [13,14]. However, such audit concerns a con-
crete policy rather than the overall view of multiple security
policies. It requires clear audit commands that are articulated
by experienced professionals and much interactive analysis.
Since in practice an anomaly pattern cannot be articulated
in advance, it is difficult to detect such fraud by the current
audit method.
The anomaly detection technology is used to identify
abnormal behaviors that are statistical outliers [15]. Some
probabilistic methods learned normal patterns, against which
they detected an anomaly [16–18]. But thesemethods assume
very few users are deviated from normal patterns. In case
there are a number of anomalous users, the normal pattern
would be diverged. These works do not examine user behav-
ior from either a historical or an incremental view, which
may overlook some malicious behaviors. Furthermore, if a
group of people collude together, it is difficult to find them
by the current methods.
In this paper, we tackle the insider threat problem from a
data-driven systemic view. User actions are recorded as his-
torical log data in a system, and our evaluation investigates
the date that users actually process. From the horizontal view,
users are grouped together according to their responsibilities
and a normal pattern is learned from the group behaviors.
This is motivated by the fact that users associated with the
same position should behave similarly or their processed
data should satisfy the similar distribution over different
aspects. Users who deviate from the normal patterns should
be suspected. We further identify which activity results in
an anomaly and its impact. If some activity is unusual in
audit results, it is an important indicator for detecting anom-
aly. Such evaluation provides a useful reference for security
administrators to set up a weight to each activity on anomaly
detection.
We investigate a suspected user also from the diachronic
view by comparing his/her historical behaviors with the
historical average of the same group. The greater this dis-
tance, the more suspicious. This evaluation can overcome
the false-positive case of overactive, namely some user may
be active than others. It also solves the gradually malicious
threat since the historical statics measures the accumulative
results.
Since many organizations enforce security policies, such
as Separation of Duty, to distributed sensitive authorizations
to multiple people, it is difficult to detect collusion by inves-
tigating each user individually. There are many practical
examples that are applicable to this context. For example, in a
financial company, a group of clerks are authorized the rights
of loan. A complete process of granting a loan is restricted to
be performed by two different persons. This security rule has
been embedded into system, and any grant definitely satisfies
this separation of duty regulation. But in fact, if two persons
colluded and together loaned a large amount of money to a
discredit company for many times, it would bring high fraud
risk. So, the collusion problem should be solved from a sys-
tem view. We investigate user relationships in the context of
sensitive tasks to assistant fraud detection.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Sect. 2, we present prior research related to thiswork. Section
3 introduces the data-driven insider threat evaluation frame-
work. Section 4 investigates the collusion problem. In Sect. 5,
we discuss how to apply our method into practical system.
Experimental evaluation is discussed in Sect. 6. Finally, we
summarize the work and offer future research direction.
2 Related Work
2.1 Database Audit
The most related work is about database audit. It audits a
database query log file against some predefined regulations.
Audit requirements are formalized as query commands on
logs. The queries referred to as sensitive data are detected as
suspicious queries [19]. This method can be classified into
two categories: syntax-based query auditing and data-based
query auditing. In syntax-based query auditing [20], normal
syntax patterns are interactively specified. The queries differ-
ent from thenormal patterns are regarded as anomaly [11,12].
Shebaro et al. [21] propose an anomalous querydetection sys-
tem and integrate it into a relational database management
system. For each query, it extracts relevant features from syn-
tax tree of SQL commands and compares with normal query
patterns so as to determine whether SQL command is an
anomaly.
Although this kind of audit can find out most unexpected
expressions, it cannot discover somemalicious querieswhich
are made up as normals. To make audit results more accu-
rate, the data-based query audit is proposed, which focuses
on actual data involved in query results [13]. It creates a fea-
ture vector on each query result and compares it with the
vectors of normal queries so as to find malicious queries.
Thong et al. propose the misuseability weight to analyze the
sensitive level of data involved in query results so as to eval-
uate the query risk, separately [5,6]. Although database audit
can protect sensitive data from malicious query effectively,
it requires some specialist to interactively specify audit com-
mands, which is time-consuming. Furthermore, it focuses on
concrete policies and cannot cover all security requirements
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of an organization. Another shortcoming is not applicable to
unexpected anomaly pattern.
2.2 Anomaly Detection
Our work is also related with the anomaly detection. Most
of these works mine user behavior patterns and determine
whether any particular user is sufficiently different from
normalities. The supervised anomaly detection approaches
require the labeled dataset so as to establish anomaly detec-
tionmodels.Newactions are classified byBayesian networks
[17,22] and hidden Markov models [23]. Such methods are
suitable for detecting anomalies against the preciously known
normal patterns, which cannot solve the anomaly detection
problem without any knowledge about context in advance.
Unsupervised approaches on anomaly detection do not
rely on training dataset. Generally, abnormal behavior detec-
tion is based on identifying behaviors that are statistical
outliers [15]. A density-based anomaly detection is pre-
sented in [18], and it measures how a user is deviated from
his/her surrounding neighbors. Authors in [16,24] present a
community-based anomaly detection system. It is based on
the assumption that similar users tend to attend or form the
same community. A statistic model is used for measuring
the distance of users from involved communities to pre-
dict anomalies. Another similar community-based method
detects the anomaly by checking whether the presence of a
user in a community will decrease the cohesion of commu-
nity [25].However, thesemethodsmainly focus on individual
view of anomaly detection and can not detect a group fraud.
A number of anomalous users can make normal behavior
pattern inclined. And these methods do not identify concrete
activities which lead to an outlier. Furthermore, these meth-
ods only consider user behaviors from a single periodwithout
evaluation on anomalies from a diachronic view, which is
desired in practice. Different from them, we would tackle
the insider threat problem by auditing user behaviors from
both parallel and historical views.
2.3 Collusion Analysis
Our work is also related to the collusion prevention and
detection. The most popular way to prevent a collusion is
authorization management in the context of access control.
It assesses the sensitive authorizations and distributes them
to multiple people so as to reduce the convenience of insider
collusion [7]. Game theory is also used for collusion analysis
[18]. It finds the optimal strategies of inside attack by search-
ing the game equilibriums. The challenge of this method is
the strategies of insiders are not easy to be obtained in an
organization due to its dynamic and evolving environments.
Collusion detection usually appears in specific situation,
such as P2P systems [26], online rating systems [12,20,23],
and so on. Online rating systems are subject to collusion
attackmainly by posting unfair rating score collaboratively. It
mayuse a frequent itemsetmining algorithm tofind candidate
groups, and then, several indicators are used for identifying
collusion groups [23]. Zimniak et al. [20] identify suspicious
collusion on rating systems by leveraging social network. It
finds that user behaviors are greatly affected by the social
distance and interest similarity in social network. Then, it
identifies collusion behavior patterns. However, these meth-
ods cannot detect the data-centric semantic fraud. Also, they
are not suitable for detecting unknown patterns in a dynamic
context.
3 Data-Driven Anomaly Detection
3.1 Basic Notions
Generally, in a large organization, there are often many busi-
ness positions. Each position is associated with a set of
responsibilities and authorizations of accessing system. A
user in a system refers to a person in real life. Each user
is assigned one or more business positions to take on the
corresponding responsibilities and perform certain tasks via
systems. For example, in the role-based access control model
(RBAC) which is widely adopted in formation applications
and database systems [27], the notion of role maps to a busi-
ness position. A user is assigned to one or multiple roles to
take on business tasks. Users taking on different roles col-
laborate together for a whole business mission. Consider an
information system does not apply RBAC, users are grouped
together according to their responsibilities. For convenience,
we represent such business position as the concept of group
so as to discuss the problem in a consistent way.
A business task completion generally requires the coordi-
nation of multiple users to meet a common goal. Each task
consists of multiple activities, where an activity refers to an
atom operation work in a system.
Definition 1 (Task and Sensitive Level)A task is a high-level
work with a certain business purpose. Each task is associated
with a sensitive level according to an organization require-
ment. A task is considered sensitive if its sensitive level is
greater than a given threshold.
Definition 2 (Activity) An activity is used for completing a
job function. A specific activity is a part of a task representing
a set of certain authorizations of performing this task. Let A
be the set of all activities in a system.
Whether a task is regarded sensitive depends on the jus-
tification of damage in case an anomaly occurs on this task.
For example, a loan of 200 million is more sensitive than a
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loan of 5 million for a bank. So, risk evaluation mainly con-
cerns sensitive tasks and user behaviors on these tasks in an
organization.
To detect insider threats from a data-driven view, we
abstract the data semantics from practical transactions. The
data involved in transactions can be classified into sensi-
tive clusters against sensitivity and transaction types. Taking
into account all aspects involved in transactions, the mul-
tiple semantic dimensions are created, called transaction
dimensions. Each transaction is then represented as the
coordinates against these dimensions. The data that a user
actually processes can be described as the statistics against
the dimensions, which is regarded as the set of user behavior
features.
Definition 3 (Transaction Dimensions) Given a specific
kind of transactions and the data attributes involved in trans-
actions, each attribute value domain is partitioned into a finite
set of value intervals according to practical data. The trans-
action dimensions Ψ are specified as the union of these sets,
denoted by Ψ = {a1, a2, . . . , a|Ψ |}.
Definition 4 (User behavior vector) Given a user u ∈ U , an
audit period τ and transaction dimensions Ψ , a user behav-
ior represents all the activities performed by u in τ . A user
behavior vector is the statistics on the occurrences against Ψ










where cτu(ai ) is the occurrence of u’s behavior on dimension











pτu (ai ) =
cτu(ai )∑
a j∈|Ψ | cτu(a j )
, i ∈ [1..|Ψ |] (3)
An audit period τ refers to a period of time such as one
year, a timewidow τ = [t1, t2] or the recent 10months. In the
following discussion, we would adopt the normalized form
of user behavior vector. Having user behavior vectors within
an audit period, the anomaly analysis is performed from both
parallel and diachronic views.We present the detectionmeth-
ods in the following two sections, respectively. For reference,
Table 1 summarizes the variables and notation used through-
out the paper.
3.2 Problem and Evaluation Framework
In this section,we present the data-driven insider threats eval-
uation framework. Since we do not have any background on
Table 1 A summary of symbols
Symbol Description
τ Audit period
cτu (a) Occurrences of user u perform activity a at τ
ντu User u
′s behavior vector at τ
ν¯τ Normal pattern of a group of users at τ
κo,Cτκo Parallel overall metric and anomaly set
κl ,Cτκl Parallel local metric and anomaly set
κh,Cτκh Diachronic metric and anomaly set
insider threat patterns in advance, a normal pattern is learned
fromdata processed by the people in the sameposition.Based
on the fact that users in the same position should take on
similar responsibilities and perform closely in a system, an
anomaly is justified against this standard.
Definition 5 (User Group and Standard Vector) Given an
audit period τ and a group of usersU , the standard vector ν¯τ
is defined as the average of user behaviors:









u∈U cτu(a j )
, i ∈ [1..|Ψ |] (5)
Definition 6 Given an audit period τ , a set of users U , a
metric κ and a positive real number as a threshold γ ∈ R+,
a user u ∈ U is called an anomaly if κτ (u,U ) > γ .
The anomaly evaluation considers both parallel and
diachronic aspects. From the parallel view, the metric κ can
be chosen as a specified audit period for a group of users.
Users who deviate from normal patterns are evaluated mali-
cious and the deviation degree is regarded as an evidence
with respect to a suspicious level. From the diachronic view,
the metric κ is set as the incremental pattern against the same
user group. The historical detection compares a user behavior
with one’s historical behaviors, as well as with other users’
historical deviation. Such diachronic analysis can avoid the
false-positive case on active persons.
To be mentioned here, our purpose is to figure out poten-
tially malicious insiders for future examination rather than
to make a definite judgment.
In this paper, we also detect the collusion of multiple
persons by learning user relationship from log data. This
justification is motivated by the actual risk highly relying on
data sensitivity. The gang who tightly cooperate on many
sensitive tasks should be kept eyes on. We would discusses
the details in the following subsections.
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3.3 Parallel Overview Metric
In parallel analysis, for each group U , a standard behavior
vector ν¯ is computed against formula 4. For each user u ∈ U ,
its behavior vector νu is computed. There are many methods
ofmeasuring the difference between twoprobability distribu-
tion vectors, such as Euclidean distance, Manhattan distance
and Kullback–Leibler divergence, etc. Since the initial pur-
pose of KL divergence [28] is to measure the uncertainty of
one probability distribution against a standard, it is consis-
tent with our measurement. Although KL divergence does
provide a measure of discrepancy between two distributions,
it is not a true metric, for example it is not symmetric. So
we make some modification on KL divergence as our evalu-
ation tool. Given two distribution vectors with the same size
P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} and Q = {q1, q2, . . . , qn}, where n
is a positive integer denoting the length of the vector, the










Λmax if pi = 0 or qi = 0
min{Λmax, | ln piqi |} if pi < qi
min{Λmax, | ln qipi |} if pi > qi
(7)
Since | ln piqi | and | ln
qi
pi
| range from 0 to infinity, we set a
maximum Λmax to bound them. In practice, the verification
of a real number in each dimension being equal 0 is difficult.
So a substitutive judgement can be selected in a very small
range. The experiments (in Sect. 6) show that the modified
KL distance enlarges the difference between two behavior
distributions, which makes the abnormal users more obvious
than others.
By this modified KL distance, we calculate the deviation
of a user behavior vector ντu = {p1, p2, . . . , p|Ψ |}. Here,
we introduce the symbol ν¯τ−u to represent the standard user
vector ν¯τ−u = { p¯1, p¯2, . . . , ¯p|Ψ |} computed against user set
U except user u, namely U − {u}. So, the distance of user u
against the normal pattern is given below:
Distτ (u,U−u) = Dˆ(ντu , ν¯τ−u) (8)
The reason of this removal of u is to eliminate the influence
of a being evaluated person. The greater the distance, the
larger deviation of u’s behaviors against the normal pattern.
The coming question is how to choose an appropriate
threshold γ τκo to justify an anomaly. A nature choice is the





However, such settingmay cause many normal users eval-
uated as anomaly. In practice, not every benign user behaves
exactly the same with the normal behavior pattern. To over-
come the overstrict justification, we introduce a threshold to
select users who obviously deviate from a normal behavior
pattern. Thismetric is based on the principle ofChebyshev’s
inequality. That is to say for a random variable with finite
expected value exception μ and finite nonzero variance σ 2,
Pr(|X − μ| ≥ γ σ) ≤ 1
γ 2
holds for any real number γ > 0.




And p percent out ofU would be regarded as malicious can-
didates. Here,μτκo is computed against Eq. 9 and the variance
σ τκo is computed against the same set of user behavior devi-
ations. Then, γ τκo =
√
1
p ∗ σ τκo . This method is based on the
assumption that there is an average percentage of a popu-
lation often act differently. Although the percentage value
does not always hold for all cases, it does provide a metric
for choosing candidates.
This threshold can be adjusted according to different
roles and audit periods. Any user whose behavior distance
is greater than the threshold is suspicious. Formally, the
overviewparallelmetricκo at audit period τ is given as below:
κτo (u,U ) = Distτ (u,U−u) − μτκo (10)
We adopt Cτκo = {u|u ∈ U ∩ κτo (u,U ) > γ τκo} to denote the
set of malicious candidates in this audit period τ .
3.4 Parallel Local Metric
In this subsection, we perform a deeper measurement on
anomalies from the local view. We use the local outlier fac-
tor (LOF for short), denoted by κl , to measure the anomaly
degree of malicious candidates in Cτκo .
Local outlier factor is used formeasuring howmuch a user
is being an outlier [18]. It is based on the concept of a local
density, which is estimated by the typical distance at which
a point can be reached from its neighbors. The locality is
given by k nearest neighbors [26]. The degree of an outlier
depends on how much a user is isolated from surrounding
neighbors.
Given two user behavior vectors ντu and ν
τ
u′ , their dis-
tance D∗(u, u′) can be calculated by the Euclidean distance
DU or the modified KL divergence Dˆ. For a user u ∈ U
and a setting k, the set of k-nearest neighbors is com-
puted to Nk(u). The distance of Nk(u) to u is defined as the
max distance between u and each nearest neighbor, namely
k-Distτ (u) = max
v∈Nk(u)
D∗(ντu , ντv ). The reachability distance
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from u is defined as:
RDτk (u, u
′) = max {k-Distτ (u), D∗(ντu , ντu′)
}
(11)
The local reachability density ofu is the inverse of the average








For a setting k, the anomaly degree LOFk(u) of user u is







|Nk(u)| · lrdτk (u)
(13)
So, a higher LOFk(u) indicates a user acts quite differ-
ently with others. If the local reachability density of a user u
is quite lower than neighbors, u should be further suspected
abnormal. From this definition, we can see that the LOF eval-
uation is very sensitive to the choice of k. We would verify
how k influences the results in the experiment section.
Choosing an appropriate thresholdγ τκl for the parallel local
metric κl can be similar with the solution on the overall par-
allel metric in last section. For a group of users U , a user
u ∈ U , the set of outliers LOFτk (u) are calculated. Then, μτκl
and σ τκl can be obtained. Under a predicated percentage p of
anomalies, the threshold is set γ τκl =
√
1
p ∗σ τκo . For example,
p = k/|U |. So, justifying an anomaly at audit period τ is
against the following rule:
Cτκl = {u|u ∈ U ∩ κτl (u,U ) > γ τκl } (14)
where κτl (u,U ) = LOFτk (u) − μτκl .
3.5 Diachronic Metric
Although the parallel metrics provide an unbiased justifica-
tion of abnormal users on a user group in an audit period, it
may evaluate an active user asmalicious. For example, if user
u’s job function is flexible, then her anomaly degree is greater
than others against parallel analysis metrics. But in fact, u′s
behavior is normal and is in consistency with historical pat-
tern. To avoid misjudge of a benign activist, a diachronic
analysis is needed. The goal of diachronic behavior analysis
is to compare a user behavior with one’s historical pattern.
If one’s behaviors are obviously different from his/her his-
torical pattern, this user should be suspected more. Such
evaluation also provides a reference for setting importance
weights to activities in anomaly detection. If the probabil-
ity of an activity evaluated anomalous is high in historical
periods, this activity is sensitive. So the weight of this activ-
ity should be set as a larger one in order to make anomaly
detection more effectively.
To make diachronic analysis on a malicious candidate
u ∈ Cτκo ∪ Cτκl , we need to choose several historical periods
as comparative references, denoted by Γ . Comparing with
the current audit period τ = [t1, t2], each chosen historical
period τ ′ = [t ′1, t ′2] ∈ Γ should satisfy t ′2 < t ′1. The timewin-
dow in audit process can be chosen from the view of desired
sensitive requirements. All chosen historical periods should
be relative to the current audit period and can represent the
overall historical pattern of a target user.
For a suspected user u and two audit periods τ and τ ′,
the behavior vectors are recorded as ντu and ν
τ ′
u . Then, their











There are many functions to calculate the similarity between
two probability distributions, such as cosine similari t y.
sim(ντu , ν
τ ′
u ) = ν
τ
u ·ντ ′u
‖ντu ‖·‖ντ ′u ‖
To justify whether the behavior variance of a user u is
normal, we need to get rid of the negative influence of the
anomaly candidates. That is to say the normal users are cho-
sen as Uˆ = {u|u ∈ U ∩ u /∈ Cτκo ∪ Cτκl }. We can obtain the
behavior vectors of Uˆ by Definition 4 on both audit periods
τ and τ ′, denoted as ν¯τ and ¯ντ ′ . Then, standard difference is
defined against them as follow:

Uˆ (τ, τ





If the behavior of a suspected user is similar with her
historical pattern, an auditor may consider his/her practical
job functions, especially for those flexible job positions. For
a user u ∈ Cτκo ∪Cτκl and a threshold γh , the historical metric
is defined





Uˆ (τ, τ ′)
}
(17)
κΓh (u,U ) > γh indicates u being different with others from
the historical aspect.
3.6 Justification of Activity
Different with the above section on how to evaluate an abnor-
mal person, this subsection discusses how to find the concrete
activity making a user seem abnormal and how much influ-
ences it may cause.
For convenience of discussion, we adopt Cτκ to denote the
union of all suspected user set, say Cκ = Cτκo ∪ Cτκl ∪ CκΓf .
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The core of our method is to assess how much each activity
influences the anomaly of a user behavior. Let ντu and ν
τ ′
u
denote the behavior vectors of u at audit period τ with activity
a and without a. We evaluate an activity a by comparing
the anomaly degree of a user u ∈ Cτκ performing a with
the anomaly degree under suppression of a. Let κτ∗ (u,U )
denote an alternative evaluation metric from κo, κl or κh .
The difference of u’s anomaly degree is denoted as 
τu(a)
and is computed as follows:

τU (u, a) = κτ∗ (u,U ) − κτ∗ (u,U−a) (18)
The larger the value
τU (u, a), the greater the likelihood that
activity a is abnormal. A larger difference indicates a larger
influence by a for u being abnormal.
An auditor needs to carefully justify whether such differ-
ence is either an inherent character or an important indicator
of anomaly. Such evaluation also provides a reference for set-
ting important weights to activities in anomaly detection. If
the probability of an activity evaluated anomalously is high
in historical periods, this activity is sensitive and a larger
weight should be set to this activity in afterward anomaly
detection.
Let τ denote an audit period and τ ′ be its successor period.
Theweight of activity a j at τ in anomaly detection is denoted
by wτj . The number of users who are detected anomalously
on a j at τ can be used as the reference of anomaly probability
of a j . Formally, for a given threshold δ,
χτ (a j ) =
∣∣{u|
τU (u, a) > δ ∩ u ∈ Cτκ }
∣∣ (19)
So the anomaly probability of a j is computed as pτj =
χτ (a j )/|U |. The importance weight of a j in anomaly detec-
tion is updated as:
wτ
′
j = wτj ∗ (1 + log pτj ) (20)












So, a user behavior vector under a weighted anomaly detec-
tion in next round of audit is denoted as Eq. 22. This








u (a1), . . ., w
τ ′|Ψ | ∗ pτ
′
u (a|Ψ |)) (22)
4 Data-Driven Collusion Detection
The above model detects each user anomaly. In this sec-
tion, we consider multiple people together collusion. Since
in practice, with the improvement of security management,
more organizations enforce security constraints in systems by
distributing privileges of fulfilling sensitive tasks to multiple
users. For example, the Separation of Duty (SoD) enforces
that single user only owns reasonable authority. As a conse-
quence, it is difficult for a single user to launch a fraud, and
he/she needs to adopt social engineering to collude with oth-
ers. Hence, the collusion risk highly increases, which relates
to the relationship between critical users who actually coop-
erate on sensitive data. The current assessment of insider
threat mostly focus on each user independently and less con-
sideration of band.
4.1 Sensitive Task Relationship
Without loss of generality, an SOD policy can be specified in
the form of SOD(a1, . . .ak), which requires k users together
complete a sensitive task, where k ∈ N+ and activities
ai , i ∈ [1. . .k] constitute the task [8]. Users who are assigned
the authorizations to perform the activities are called criti-
cal users. From the business aspect, users only involved in
the same sensitive task have chances to commit fraud. So,
our collusion analysis focuses on sensitive-tasks-driven user
relationship.
Let Ts be the set of sensitive tasks in an audit period τ ,
which are defined against organization context. For each sen-
sitive task t ∈ Ts , let Ut denote the set of users involved in
t . Let t.ai denote the person who performed activity ai . For
example, to loan larger than 100 million is a sensitive task.
For security purpose, two persons are required to complete
this task, say SOD(a1, a2). Suppose three users, Alice, Bob
and Carol, are authorized to perform a1, and two users Dan
and Frank, are authorized to perform a2. In τ , there are a
set of sensitive loan tasks Ts = {t1, t2, t3}, which are com-
pleted by Ut1 = {Alice, Dan},Ut2 = {Carol, Dan} and
Ut1 = {Alice, Frank}. We first quantify the relationships
between user and sensitive activities and then justify user
relationship of sensitivity.
Definition 7 (ι-SensitiveRelationship)Given an audit period
τ , a sensitive level ι ∈ N+, a security policy SOD =
(a1, . . .ak) and a set of sensitive tasks T τs at τ , the relation-
ship between user u and activity ai ∈ SOD is defined as
follow:
sτι (u, ai ) =
∑
t∈T τs
t.level ∗ 1(t.level > ι ∧ u = t.ai )) (23)
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where t.level is the sensitivity level of task t , 1(∗) is the
index function which equals 1 when the expression holds
and 0 otherwise.
ι-sensitive relationship quantifies how many times a user
participates in sensitive tasks by performing a specific activ-
ity. So the cumulative risk relates to task sensitivity. Having
this relationship, we can create a weighted bipartite graph,
which provides a reference to justify the chance for multiple
users to commit fraud.
Definition 8 (ι-Sensitive Graph) Given an audit period τ , an
ι-Sensitive Graph Gτι =< A ∪ B, E, W > is defined as a
bipartite graph, where the nodes in A represent users and B
is the set of sensitive activities in SOD. Each weighted edge
represents the ι-sensitive relationship sτι (u, v) between u and
v.
Definition 9 (γ -SOD Graph) Given a positive real number
γ ∈ R+ as a risk threshold, an ι-sensitive graph Gτι and
a policy SOD(a1, . . .ak) (SOD ⊂ B), the γ -SOD Graph
γ -Gτι =< A ∪ SOD, Eγ , W γ > is a subgraph of Gτι such
that ∀(u, v) ∈ Eγ , sτι (u, v) > γ .
A γ -SOD graph remains the user activity relationship that
is higher than γ , based on which, an auditor detects a high
risky band by verifying whether there is a Vertex Cover on
SOD nodes. The threshold γ can be set by auditors against
the importance of business, that evaluates the potentially
damage in case an attack occurs. The higher γ , the higher
fraud risk.
4.2 Critical User Relationship
Definition 10 (User Closeness) Given an audit period τ , a
sensitive task set T τs and two users ∀ui , u j ∈ U involved in
T τs , user closeness is defined as their accumulative sensitive
tasks,
r τi j =
∑
t∈T τs
t.level ∗ 1(ui ∈ Ut ∧ u j ∈ Ut ) (24)
where t.level is the sensitivity level of task t , 1(∗) is the
index function which equals 1 when the expression holds
and 0 otherwise.
User closeness quantifies how many times two users
together participate in sensitive tasks. So for each SOD pol-
icy, the set of users involved in related sensitive tasks consist
of a weighted graph Gτ = <V, E, W>, called user relation-
ship graph, where each node in V represents a user and the
weight of each edge denotes user closeness. Since a security
policy requires a set of users together to complete a sensitive
task, this graph also provides a reference to justify the chance
for multiple users collusion.
Definition 11 (γ -User Graph) Given an audit period τ , a
user relationship graph Gτ =< V, E, W > at τ and a pos-
itive real number γ ∈ R+ as a threshold, the γ -user graph
Gτγ =< V, Eγ , Wγ > is a subgraph ofGτ , where the weight
of each edge (u, v) ∈ Eγ satisfies wτuv > γ .
For each security policy SOD = (a1, . . .ak), the user rela-
tionship graph reflects user collaboration on sensitive tasks.
So an auditor can set a risk threshold γ and create a γ -user
graph Gτγ . Then, a high risky band can be detected by ver-
ifying whether there is a k clique on Gτγ . If we together
consider user relationship in real life, the collusion probabil-
ity increases, such as family relatives, previous colleagues,
graduates from the same university, common friends, etc.
Auditors should pay more attention on such users or reallo-
cate their responsibilities.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the adaptability of the proposed
model. Firstly, we adopt a role-based access control (RBAC)
system to illustrate how to enforce the proposed model into
practical applications.
In an RBAC system, users complete their responsibilities
via assigned roles. User behaviors in system are recorded
in log files, denoted as Operation Record. Users with the
same role should behave similarly. For user u, each opera-
tion on activity a for task ts via role r is recorded in the
form of rec = <u, r, a, ts, t> in the system, where t is
the timestamp. An auditor can justify the sensitive tasks for
anomaly audit, and a behavior vector is created against the
sensitive tasks for each user. Audit commands are used to
select the behavior records of audited users from log files.
Definition 12 (Audit Command) An audit command is
denoted as a tuple AC=<user , role, a, task, t1, t2>, where
user ∈ U , role ∈ R, a ∈ A, and task ∈ T . t1, t2 are the
time stamps satisfying t1 < t2.
The selected behaviors by an audit command are denoted
as REC , satisfying REC = {rec|rec.u = user ∧ rec.r =
role∧rec.a = activi t y∧rec.ts = task∧ t1 ≤ rec.time ≤
t2, rec ∈ LogFile}. Concerning different purposes, the
above audit command can be in some special forms. Each
entry in the audit command can be specified as ’∗’ if we
want to select all corresponding records. The following are
some examples.
Example 1 (Select the records about a user)
AC1 = <Alice, ∗, ∗, ∗, 20140101, 20140105> selects all
operation records performed by Alice between
20140101 and 20140105.
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AC2 = <Alice, casher, ∗, ∗, 20140101, 20140105>
restricts this selection to the role casher .
Example 2 (Select the records about a specific role)
AC3 = <∗, casher, ∗, ∗, 20140101, 20141212> selects all
user action records on role casher during the period of
[20140101, 20141212].
Example 3 (Select the records about a specific task)
AC4 = <∗, ∗, ∗, loan, 20140101, 20140110> selects all
users’ operations about the task loan during the period of
[20140101, 20140110].
The basic idea of the proposedmodel is to quantify insider
threat via data that a user actually processed in a system. It
resides on two aspects: the probability of fraud and the poten-
tial loss it may cause. The former depends on the occurrences
of performing sensitive tasks, and the later depends on a task
sensitivity. As previously discussed, we adopt the sensitivity
level to represent the importance of a task. For example, to
loan 100 million is more risky than to loan 100 thousand.
Also, to loan 100 million to a company with 5 star credibility
is less risky than to a 1 star credibility company. It is easy to
understand that a manager can set up a set of rules to spec-
ify such assessment on business risk. Each rule maps to one
transaction dimension as Defined in 3.
Example 4 Given a set of business rules on risk level RS =
{([0, 106],Low), ([106, 108],Mid), ([108,−],High)} and a
set of credibilities of company CRED = {(A, l1), (B, l2),
(C, l3), (D, l5)}, we can specify a set of transaction dimen-
sion as Ψ = RS × CRED = {(Low, l1), (Low, l2),. . .,
(High, l5)}. The size of Ψ is 3*5= 15. A highly sensitive
activity can be associated with a lager weight. For example,
(High, l1) = 0.8 denotes the risk weight is 0.8 for a loan
larger than 108 to a l1 low-credibility company. Having these
rules, user behavior vectors are created against transaction
dimension that they actually performed. So, the proposed
model can quantify highly risky tasks and find critical users.
Although the specificationof transactiondimensionmayvary
in different situation such as organization and audit periods, it
does provide a quantification on business risk. In this context,
using the number of performing sensitive activities can reflect
the probability of fraud.
Another aspect needed justification is the normal pattern.
Although it is learned from group users, it does not mean that
only the average user is benign. We have proposed a set of
metrics to evaluate a user behavior from several aspects, such
as parallel overall metric, parallel local metric and historical
metric, etc., which should be taken into account so as to find
those users who deviate much from several normal patterns.
To be mentioned here, many departments materialize well-
defined separation of duty policies. But it does not influence
our justification since we evaluate users on the same position
or same role in a system. Considering the case of multiple
people collusion, we adopt the second model to detect them.
Compared with previous works, our model has three
contributions: it integrates business context into risk quantifi-
cation; it proposes several metrics to quantify user behavior
risk fromdifferent aspects; and it presents the collusiondetec-
tion.
6 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
method.Wefirstly introduce the real dataset and how to inject
anomalies. Then, we analyze the effectiveness and efficiency
of our method from two aspects.
6.1 Datasets
This paper is about anomaly detection of user behaviors. An
ideal dataset should be obtained from a practical systemwith
concrete job functions. But in fact, it is very sensitive for
almost every organization or company. We adopt two real
datasets.
The first dataset SALE adopts the transaction records
from a provincial department of a large energy retail enter-
prise. It contains 37 millions data items collected from Jun
2014 to April 2015. Each record maps to a transaction. There
are total 6886 concrete persons in the dataset. We first ana-
lyze each attribute of the transaction data and finally create
the transaction dimensions DT with the size of 60. Then,
all users are clustered into 30 categories against DT . Each
cluster is regarded as a business position in our evaluation.
We choose four representative clusters and the details are as
follows: cluster 13 with size 1279, cluster 11 with size 764,
cluster 30 with size 417 and cluster 23 with size 218.
The second dataset STU is the collected network access
record from a group of students in our university. We adopt
Wireshark, a free and open-source packet analyzer. The
dataset contains 2,655,223 records, 221 students, whichwere
collected in January, 2015. We focus on student access of
network during 24 hours of each day, which are regarded
as activities. Each user behavior vector is computed against
these activities. The normal behavior patterns are created by
learning the behaviors of all students. In the whole process,
students did not know theyweremonitored and the collection
of user behaviors are without any bias.
Although there are unusual students in real dataset, we
also inject some anomalies for detection. The injected anom-
alies are set differentlywith the normal behavior pattern from
123
82 Y. Sun et al.
(a) (b) (c)
(f)(e)(d)
Fig. 1 Evaluation against different metrics. a Cluster 23, b Cluster 13, c Parallel analysis, d Cluster 30, e Cluster 11, f Historical analysis
several aspects. We set an anomaly factor p to indicate the
percentage of abnormal users out of the whole user set, say
|U | × p outliers are injected. For each outlier u, the injec-
tion is achieved via three random processes. The first random
process is to generate a percentage p, which means there are
|U | ∗ p users abnormal. The second random process is the
percentage α of abnormal activities such that |A| ∗ α activ-
ities are randomly chosen as abnormal. The third random
process is to generate the value p
a j
u for different activity j ,
which means the execution of activity is abnormal. By this
injection rule, we generate a variety of datasets with differ-
ent parameters p and α, etc. For each setting, we perform 10
experiments and report the average values.
6.2 Parallel Analysis
We first perform the parallel analysis. Figure 1a, d shows the
anomaly evaluation on dataset SALE by both the modified
KL-distance and the Euclidean distance. The larger the each
point values, the more abnormal behaviors are. From the
results, we can see that the peaks on different distancemetrics
follow the same rules. This indicates that users obviously
deviate from normal pattern and twometrics are consistent in
detecting anomalies. Differently, the modified KL-distance
amplifies the deviation than Euclidean distance.
Figure 1b, e present the abnormal results on dataset SALE
in another way. The x-axis gives the modified KL-distance,
while the y-axis gives the Euclidean distance. From the
results, we can see that for a given k, the top-k abnormal users
are slightly different. In cluster 13, the top-k users overlap
more against two metrics than in cluster 11. After having a
look at the concrete data, we find many zero values in abnor-
mal behavior vectors of cluster 11, which cause the distance
computation different. Overall, the more the points reside
along the approximation line, the more consistent they are
on the behavior detection against two distance metrics.
The results of parallel analysis on dataset STU are shown
in Figure 1c, f. From the results, we can see that there are
9 distinct peaks on the modified KL-distance, which means
these users obviously deviate from normal pattern. This fol-
lows the similar trend as results in SALE .
Figure 2 shows the results of parallel local outlier detec-
tion based on LOF metric on dataset SALE. The Fig. 2a, b, d,
e refers to results on Cluster 11, 13, 23 and 30. In each sub-
figure, the x-axis refers to the number of abnormal users and
the y-axis is the predicated percentage p. Since the compu-
tation of LOF is based on the k-nearest neighbors, we adopt
different colors to represent the result of different k. In these
figures, the number of abnormal users increases with p under
a certain k. This is because an increasing p indicates lower
anomaly criterion to identify users anomaly. Given a fixed
p, the results vary under different ks. For example, when
p = 10%, the number of abnormal users is the highest
under k = 4 in Fig. 2a, while the highest number occurs
under k = 3.
6.3 Historical Analysis
Weperformahistorical anomaly detection for each suspected
user by comparing his/her behavior in a period to historical
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(a) (b) (c)
(f)(e)(d)
Fig. 2 Local outlier detection and consistence analysis. a Cluster 11, b Cluster 13, cModified KL-distance, d Cluster 23, e Cluster 30, f Euclidean
distance
records so as to find an abnormal change. Figure 1f shows
the historical variance of potential anomalies in STU . The
blue solid line is the variance by Eq. 15, and the red dotted
line is the normalized Euclidean distance. In the figure, the 6
high points in blue solid line are the injected outliers, which
are obviously different from historical behaviors. Compara-
tively, the 9 low points in blue line are only slightly different
with their historical behaviors, who are actually real users
in dataset. Although their behaviors are deviated from oth-
ers, they conform to the similar regular routines, respectively.
This proves that our diachronic analysis is effective for anom-
aly detection and can avoid false detection on normal users.
To make a comparison between parallel and historical
evaluation, we evaluate the concrete anomaly persons on
SALE dataset. The results are shown in Fig. 2c, f, where
the x-axis is the parallel evaluation against different chosen
percentages p, the y-axis is historical evaluation against dif-
ferent percentages p and the settings of p are 5%, 10, 15
and 20%. The z-axis is the number of detected anomalous
users on the corresponding x and y settings. The left figure
adopts the modified KL-distance, and the right figure shows
the results against the Euclidean distance. For example, on
the point (x = 5%, y = 5%) in Fig. 2c, z = 19 means 19
users are detected as anomaly in both parallel and historical
evaluation against p = 5%. If the point resides on x-axis,
namely (y = 0), the anomalous users are detected only by the






























Fig. 3 Anomaly activity detection
cal detection. Such intersect examination can help an auditor
better understand user behaviors.
6.4 Anomaly Activity Detection
Figure 3 shows the results of anomaly activity detection. The
x-axis refers to 10 different activities, and the y-axis gives the
change of anomaly degree without a certain activity, which is
computed according to Eq. 18. From this picture, we can see
that the 6th activity, which is the amount of diesel purchase
in the real dataset, is abnormal in cluster 23 and 30. While
for cluster 11 and 13, the anomaly activity is the 8th activity,
which is the amount of No. 92 gasoline purchase.
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Fig. 4 Comparison with related
methods. a F1, b Accuracy
(a) (b)
Table 2 F1 score
k Anomaly Factor p
4 (%) 5 (%) 6 (%) 7 (%) 8 (%) 9 (%) 10 (%)
3 33.3 45.5 60.0 62.5 61.1 61.9 58.0
4 88.9 90.9 93.3 93.8 94.4 95.2 91.7
5 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
6 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
6.5 Comparison with Related Method
We compare ourmethodwith themost related work, which is
the specialized network anomalous insider actions detection
method (SNAD for short) proposed in [25]. We measured
the performance by the well-known metrics F1 measure and
Accuracy, which are defined as follows,
F1 = 2 × Recall × Precision
Recall + Precision
Accuracy = |T P| + |T N ||U |
(25)
where |T P| means the number of true positives and |T N |
means the number of true negatives.
The parameters in our method are k = 4 and k = 5,
respectively. Figure 4a shows the comparison of F1 measure
and Fig. 4b compares the Accuracy of two methods. Both
results show that ourmethod outperforms SNADon different
k settings.
6.6 Evaluation of Parameter Setting
In the anomalymeasurement, the results highly rely on selec-
tion of the parameter k. Malicious users are identified by
anomaly degree in our model, so the performance is very
sensitive to k. We evaluate our method by F1 and Accuracy
measures. The results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Overall,
both F1 and Accuracy are high under different anomaly
factor p settings and a larger k brings a better result. For
Table 3 Accuracy measurement
k Anomaly factor p
4 (%) 5 (%) 6 (%) 7 (%) 8 (%) 9 (%) 10 (%)
3 94.6 94.6 94.7 94.7 93.9 93.1 91.5
4 99.1 99.1 99.1 99.1 99.1 99.1 98.3
5 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.2
6 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
example, although F1 is relatively small in the case k = 3, it
increases well after k > 4, almost 100%. As to Accuracy,
our method is more effective, and the accuracies are greater
than 90% with different anomaly factor p in all different k
settings.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we tackle the insider threat problem by audit-
ing user behaviors from both parallel and incremental views
with probabilistic methods. The basic idea is that users asso-
ciated with the same responsibilities should behave similarly
in an information system. Users who deviate from normal
patterns are regarded as malicious candidates and the anom-
aly degree is evaluated as an evidence in conformity with
malicious probability. To avoid false justification on benign
active users, we analyze the anomalies from a diachronic
view by comparing a user behavior with one’s historical data.
We also justify the negative influence on abnormal degree by
activities, which provides a reference for setting importance
weights to activities in anomaly detection. At last, we per-
form experiments to verify our methods and the results show
it is effective in detection. In the future, we would investi-
gatemore sophisticated patterns on insider threat and use real
dataset to improve the metrics.
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